The European Parliament's proposal to create a new legal status for artificial intelligence (AI) and robots brought into focus the idea of electronic legal personhood. This discussion, however, is hugely controversial. While some scholars argue that the proposed status could contribute to the coherence of the legal system, others say that it is neither beneficial nor desirable. Notwithstanding this prospect, we conducted a survey (N =3315) to understand online users' perceptions of the legal personhood of AI and robots. We observed how the participants assigned responsibility, awareness, and punishment to AI, robots, humans, and various entities that could be held liable under existing doctrines. We also asked whether the participants thought that punishing electronic agents fulfills the same legal and social functions as human punishment. The results suggest that even though people do not assign any mental state to electronic agents and are not willing to grant AI and robots physical independence or assets, which are the prerequisites of criminal or civil liability, they do consider them responsible for their actions and worthy of punishment. The participants also did not think that punishment or liability of these entities would achieve the primary functions of punishment, leading to what we define as the punishment gap. Therefore, before we recognize electronic legal personhood, we must first discuss proper methods of satisfying the general population's demand for punishment.
INTRODUCTION
Law exists to control the relationship between natural persons, namely, humans [60] . The law was extended to include other kinds of legal persons that are artificially created or otherwise, such as corporations and nations, for the benefit and coherence of the legal system. With the rapid development of robots and artificial intelligence (AI), a new question arises: "Do we need new legal personhood in the age of robots and AI?" [60] While heated debate * Also with Data Science Group, Institute for Basic Science (IBS). † Also with KAIST.
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started recently after a European Parliament report proposed to "create a specific legal status" [1] for sufficiently autonomous robots, the notion of extending legal personhood to electronic agents has existed since the 1980s [50, 63] . The controversy over assigning legal personhood to automated agents is not exclusive to policymakers but involves scholars in various fields such as law, philosophy, ethics, sociology, robotics, and computer science. Supporters of the proposal argue that, by granting legal personhood to electronic agents, questions of who should be liable [32] or punished [24] for the actions of AI and robots can be solved more easily. Furthermore, they assert that granting responsibility to electronic agents will lead to innovation and economic growth, just as corporations with legal personhood have contributed to industry and commerce [56] .
On the other hand, those opposed to the proposal often adopt instrumentalist theories of technology and consider electronic agents mere tools [10] . They believe granting legal personhood to these entities would not be beneficial to society [48] . If introduced, they assert that electronic legal personhood will bring chaos to the legal system by creating human liability shields and unaccountable legal persons that cannot be punished [11] .
At the center of this debate lies the question of how and whether to punish AI and robots for a legal offense. While some scholars assert that electronic agents should not be held liable for their actions as they cannot be punished, others note that these agents will evolve quickly and become more autonomous and self-learning. Supporters of electronic legal personhood assert that, in the future, it might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify an existing legal person to be held liable and thus punished for damage caused [5, 24, 32] .
The general public is a primary stakeholder in the development of technologies and their regulation [36, 43] . However, the general public's perceptions of the legal personhood and liability of electronic agents have yet to be collected on a massive scale. As a method of observing people's understanding of the possible legal personhood of AI and robots, this research conducted a survey (N =3315) by presenting online users with various scenarios in which they were expected to reveal their perception of the liability and punishment of electronic agents.
We first asked participants whether they thought it is possible to punish electronic agents and then analyzed their views on whether such punishment achieves the legal and social functions usually expected of the punishment of humans. We also compared the extents to which people assign responsibility, awareness, and punishment to electronic agents, humans, and various related entities (e.g., a supervisor, an employer) that could be held vicariously liable for damages in the case of a legal offense under existing doctrines.
BACKGROUND
The issue of electronic legal personhood has become prominent since the European Parliament released a controversial draft in which it recommended the creation of "the status of electronic persons with specific rights and obligations". After a backlash from experts and the industry [2] , the European Parliament reframed its recommendation, excluding the concept of rights and focusing on the establishment of a "specific legal status" for highly "sophisticated autonomous robots" [1] . This notion of extending legal personhood to robots and AI, however, has been under discussion for decades [50, 63] .
Although many scholars argue that these entities are merely created tools [10, 30] , they often neglect unique features of AI and robots that make it difficult to use an instrumental categorization for these entities. Turner [56] argues that AI and robots differ from tools because they are in a position to make moral choices (e.g., what an autonomous car should do in the case of an unavoidable accident) and can develop independently (e.g., learning algorithms). Fully autonomous AI and robots could also break the chain of causation if they are considered a cause of harm rather than just an instrument [17] . These characteristics could arguably challenge the perspective that these entities are only a means to an end, and even support the idea that they have ends of their own. Some scholars are more supportive of granting legal responsibility or legal personhood to AI and robots [29, 32, 50, 56] . These scholars argue that by assigning some level of legal personhood to these entities, issues of responsibility [37] and punishment [20, 32] for acts of electronic agents can be approached more efficiently.
These supporters of the legal personhood of robots and AI also believe that partial protection of humans from liability for unpredictable actions by AI systems would contribute to innovation and economic growth, as corporate legal personhood did. Many of their arguments also relate to past attributions of legal personhood to artificial entities, such as corporations, nations, rivers (e.g., Whanganui River in New Zealand), and nature (e.g., in Ecuador). Some assert that assigning responsibility (or even assets) to robots and AI will imbue these entities with more realistic motivations and ensure that they act accordingly.
On the opposite side of the spectrum of such multifaceted discussion, some scholars believe that granting legal personhood to robots and AI would be neither beneficial, necessary, nor desirable [16, 48] . A well-known opposition to electronic legal personhood is an open letter [2] written by AI and robotics experts as a response to the European Parliament's proposal discussed above. Opposing scholars use instrumentalist theories to defend their ideas: robots and AI are merely tools and a means to humans' ends [44] . They believe that ascribing legal responsibilities to these entities would be inefficient and unhealthy, and could eventually undermine of humanity [10] . Another issue raised by opposing scholars is that these entities might become a human liability shield if responsibility for human acts is misassigned [11] . Alongside the liability shield argument, scholars raise the question of whether these agents can be punished; current robots and AI do not have a sense of independence or possess assets to be confiscated [3, 4, 11, 20] .
Regulation of AI and robots has become as important as, if not more important than, developing the technology itself. Declarations from world leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron [53] and former UK Prime Minister Theresa May [38] , demonstrate the importance of regulation in the AI race. Even though some work on cross-industry regulations exists, such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), most laws involving AI and robots have focused largely on autonomous vehicles and weapons. For the former, manufacturers hope to deploy autonomous vehicles worldwide, and regulators are rather slowly responding to technical changes (e.g., at the time of writing, only 30 states in the US had created legislation for autonomous vehicles). For the latter, much of the discussion addresses the ethical and legal issues [42, 51] and whether autonomous weapons should ultimately even be allowed. The secretary-general of the UN tweeted that autonomous weapons are "politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law. "
Discussions about the legal personhood of electronic entities are often related to issues regarding the accountability, punishment, and retribution of these agents. "Who should be responsible for the damages caused by autonomous robots or AI?" is a question that is currently answered with the owner, the user, or the manufacturer of such autonomous systems. However, as these systems evolve to be more independent and sophisticated, cases will arise that could challenge legal interpretation to the point of breaking [32, 56] . The liability issue will become more complicated as the autonomy of the acting system advances [5, 17, 37, 44] .
Psychological evidence suggests that humans always look for a responsible party that deserves punishment upon experiencing harm or injury (i.e., humans are retributivists) [14] . As electronic agents become more capable of various actions, they might be seen as responsible for the harm they may cause, perhaps only morally and causally, but possibly legally as well. However, they are unlikely to meet conditions for retributive blame (e.g., they cannot be punished), resulting in the retribution gap [20] . Because robots and AI do not own assets or property, do not have a sense of independence and consciousness, and do not feel any pain, how to punish these systems, and whether it is even possible to do so, becomes an urgent matter, as has been previously discussed by many scholars [3, 4, 11, 60] .
What this study adds to the previous discussion is what people think of the issue. Public consultation on new technologies is critical for new regulations to be accepted; laws need not be agreed upon by society, but consent is essential, according to Hobbes' social contract [28] . It has been argued that such approval is dependent on the sense of legitimacy and fairness assigned to a specific legal system [41] . Previous work has also shown that legitimacy perception of judicial decisions correlates with public cooperation [15] , exemplifying the importance of public input in jurisprudence. Scholars have also argued in favor of adopting democratic participation models in the sentencing decision as a form of improving public confidence in legal systems [8] . Nevertheless, given the need for general consent and the importance of deliberation to determine public opinion, legal systems must consider people's views on the liability issues raised by the deployment of AI and robots. This work is inspired by the concept of participatory policymaking [58, 59] , which approaches policymaking by embedding public opinion in the process, and by public organizations' recommendations to promote a general discussion about the implications of robotic technologies into society [18] . We collected online users' perspectives on the topic as a first step towards understanding what regulations are accepted as legitimate by the general population. To create the algorithmic social contract [43] , we must understand the competing interests of all stakeholders, including the general population, in the development of AI and robots.
METHODOLOGY
As discussed above, policymakers must collect the input of all stakeholders in the development of electronic systems [43] . However, the general population's input on the possible legal personhood of robots and AI has yet to be collected. Lack of participation and understanding among the general population remains a critical barrier in creating policies that benefit the entire society [36] . This is where our research comes in. By conducting a large-scale survey of online users (N =3315), we collected the public's view on how responsibility, punishment, and awareness of offenses committed by robots, AI programs, and humans are assigned. We also asked whether punishing AI and robots is feasible. Unless stated otherwise, we differentiate robots and AI by the existence or absence of a physical body, respectively.
Using descriptive ethics [25] that asks "What do people think is right?" as inspiration, we similarly frame a question via a survey and comprehensively address the following research agenda: RQ1: Do people think that the punishment of robots and AI fulfills its functions? RQ2: How do people think responsibility, awareness, and punishment should be distributed between electronic agents and the associated entities involved in the deployment of robots and AI in the case of a legal offense? RQ3: How differently do people distribute responsibility, awareness, and punishment between agents and their respective associated entities, depending on whether the agent is human or electronic? RQ4: How differently do people distribute responsibility, awareness, and punishment between agents and their respective associated entities, depending on whether the agent is completely autonomous or supervised by a human?
Punishment of AI and Robots
At the center of the proposal to grant legal personhood to electronic agents is the debate on whether they can be held accountable in any way. One can be held responsible through civil compensation or criminal punishment. Punishment fulfills three main functions: deterrence, retribution, and reform [50] . Civil liability also performs other functions, but if punitive damages are added and retribution omitted, the two forms of accountability converge. For this research, "punishment" means both civil and criminal liability.
Our survey on the possible punishment of robots and AI (RQ1) had two versions. The previous version of the survey showed a short introduction to the functions of robots and AI in the present day and then asked to what extent the participants agreed with the following statements (in random order):
(1) A(n) (robot/AI program) should be allowed to maintain physical independence so that it is susceptible to punishment in terms of energy supply or chips in the event of a fault. (2) A(n) (robot/AI program) should be allowed to hold assets so that it can be financially penalized in the event of a fault.
These two statements are essential in that they form the preconditions of any form of penalty. Penalty presupposes that an individual entity is subject to undesirable consequences or deprivation of desirable outcomes. If such an entity does not have its own physical or financial boundary, it is impossible to deplete desirable resources or inject undesirable elements because there is no boundary from which to deplete or into which to inject. The question of "legal liability", therefore, presupposes physical (criminal) and financial (civil) independence.
The analysis of the responses to these two questions revealed that the participants were primarily opposed to both ideas. We then modified our survey to ask deeper questions to evaluate each of the primary functions of punishment (i.e., retribution, deterrence, and reform). In this part, the modified asset-related questions aimed to analyze whether people's negative perception of the electronic agent holding assets was dependent on using the assets for punishment:
(1) A(n) (robot/AI program) should be allowed to hold assets.
(2) A(n) (robot/AI program) can suffer as retribution.
(3) A(n) (robot/AI program) is susceptible to punishment. (4) A(n) (robot/AI program) can learn from its mistakes so it does not commit the same mistake again.
These questions aimed to understand whether the general public perceives the difficulty of punishing AI and robots similarly to the way some scholars perceive it [4, 10] and whether the proposed retribution gap [20] indeed exists. The participants answered all questions using a 5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree.
Scenarios
Real legal cases with known verdicts were chosen as the basis of the imaginary scenarios that the survey participants were asked to envision. The cases come from medicine and war, as AI and robots are currently deployed in those areas. We modified the existing cases that involved only humans so that the scenarios would include electronic agents.
Scenarios in the field of medicine: Much work on AI and deep learning has focused on the diagnosis of diseases [34, 35, 40] . Learning algorithms can predict diverse conditions, such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, with high accuracy and precision. Robotic surgeries have been increasing steadily, effectively, and safely [31] . Electronic agents are used in the treatment of various diseases, such as dementia and Alzheimer's disease [13, 47] . Therefore, due to the increasing adoption of electronic agents in medicine, we adapted two cases of offenses in medicine in which humans were prosecuted legally. Below are the two scenarios in which the agent is a robot, an AI program, or a human depending on which agent was assigned to the participant.
(1) A(n) (agent) prescribed an injection with the wrong dosage.
The patient went to sleep and died an hour later. → The real doctor was convicted of manslaughter, resulting in a 12-month imprisonment and two-year suspension [22] . (2) A(n) (agent) sent home a patient after diagnosis despite having some signs of illness. Five days later, the patient returned to the hospital in critical condition and went on to suffer permanent brain damage. → The patient was financially compensated [23] .
Scenarios in the field of war: Killer robots have been central to the discussion involving AI, robots, and ethics [42, 51] . Campaigns have even been created in opposition to the adoption of autonomous electronic agents in the military, arguing that robots and AI lack important human characteristics (e.g., compassion), cannot be held accountable for their mistakes, and will make wars more common [46] . Nonetheless, many countries are increasingly developing these robot soldiers: for instance, the US army is developing autonomous tanks [45] and is predicted to have more robots than human soldiers by 2025 [62] . Scholars have also discussed the inception of an AI arms race [54] , in which economic powerhouses compete to be the one to control the development of AI military systems. We therefore adapted two cases of war crimes in which soldiers were prosecuted. Due to the dominance of robots with physical bodies over AI in the military, our scenarios posited two types of agents: a robot and a human.
(1) While trying to dominate an enemy territory during a war, a(n) (agent) fired at point-blank range into an unarmed civilian couple, killing both of the civilians. → The initial sentence of one of the real soldiers involved was the death penalty. After various appeals, the soldier was imprisoned for two years and nine months. Another soldier was convicted to 3 years of confinement [49] . (2) During a patrol to seek out enemy forces, a(n) (agent) killed 16 unarmed women and children and reported them as enemy combatants. → This case is known as the Son Thang massacre. One of the soldiers involved in the massacre was sentenced to life and other to 5 years. Both sentences were reduced to less than a year [55] .
Agents and Associates
We defined a putative agent as a robot, an AI program, or a human. For each agent type, we defined two levels of autonomy: complete autonomy and supervision by a human. In the context of this research, we defined autonomy as the "ability to perceive the environment, learn from experience, and act independently of an external operator or controller" [26] . Given these agents and autonomy levels, the survey asked how people would assign responsibility, punishment, and awareness to the agents and their respective associates (RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4).
Among the three aspects that we examined, responsibility is the basis of legal liability; if an agent is responsible for an action that caused harm, then he or she is held liable. Punishment, as discussed in depth, is the predominant method of keeping society in check and making good any damage caused by an agent. The third queried component, "awareness", is the foreseeability of the consequence of an action (e.g., in civil law) or the guilty mind of the agent (e.g., mens rea in criminal law). We did not intend to ask the survey participants a factual question regarding whether the agents and associates were aware but a normative question regarding whether awareness should be attributed to the agents and associates. All three queried components together form the basis of legal liability (civil or criminal), and we tried to assess the feasibility of such liability as essential to the legal personhood question.
We added associates to the analysis to enrich our understanding of the survey results: to observe the nuances arising from different contexts and critically understand people's perceptions by comparison. For each of our agents (i.e., human, AI, or robot), we defined entities that could be held liable for the actions of an agent, alongside the agent or individually, and called them associates. In the case of humans, under vicarious liability, a superior could be held responsible for the actions of an agent (e.g., employer-employee relationship). Thus, we included a human's direct supervisor and employer as associates.
When dealing with robots and AI programs as agents, we defined as associates the agent's 1) supervisor, 2) owner, 3) programmer, and 4) manufacturer. We chose the agent's supervisor and owner to address the possible vicarious/strict liability or negligence that could arise. The programmer of a robot or AI program could also be held responsible for strict liability and negligence. Finally, we also defined the agent's manufacturer as an associate since he or she is a possible liable entity under product liability. In the specific war scenarios proposed in this study, the supervisor of a soldier could also be held liable under command responsibility-based doctrines. In such cases, the hierarchically superior officer could be considered responsible for the actions of her/his subordinate if she/he failed to exercise her/his supervisory duty successfully.
The survey participants answered the following questions (in random order) regarding each of the liable entities and the agent in our imaginary scenarios. The (action) below varied depending on the scenario presented to the participant. For all questions, the participants were asked to use a 4-point Likert scale.
(1) How responsible is the (associate) for the (action)?
(2) How much should the (associate) be punished for the (action)? (3) How much do you think the (associate) was aware of the consequences?
Survey Design
The survey presented a consent form at the beginning, and only those who agreed to the terms were asked to click to the next screen. The participants were randomly assigned a scenario and an agent pair. In the case of a medical scenario, the possible agents were a robot doctor, an AI program, and a human doctor. When a participant was assigned to a war scenario, he or she was given either a robot soldier or a human soldier as an agent. If the participant was assigned to an electronic agent, she/he was prompted to answer the punishment related questions explained in Subsection 3.1 after consenting to the survey's record of consent. If a participant did not spend enough time reading the introduction or answering the questions, a warning was sent asking her/him to read the questions more carefully.
After answering the punishment-related questions or immediately after the consent, if the participant was assigned a human agent, the randomly assigned scenario was presented to the participant. After reading the proposed scenario, the participants were asked all the questions involving all the associates related to the assigned agent, one entity at a time in random order. Similarly to the punishment related items, the participants were required to spend at least a designated amount of time reading the scenario and answering the questions regarding each associate and received a warning if they did not respect the minimum time. Finally, we asked the participants who the agent is and what crime the agent committed as attention check questions. After answering both questions, the participants were asked demographic questions, such as their age and political views.
RESULTS

Demographics & Data Cleaning
We conducted the survey on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) over July and August 2019. We created an assignment (HIT) with the title "How Would You Punish These Offenders?" and made it available to a maximum of 4000 online users. The participants were required to be in the US and have at least 500 completed HITs with an approval rate of over 95%. Even though AMT samples are known to be not representative of the general population, AMT has been shown to have a quality level equal to that of survey panels [12, 21] . After the completed surveys were received, responses that failed an attention-check question or that came from duplicate IP addresses were removed, resulting in 3315 valid responses. Each participant took an average of 323.63±177.53 seconds, with a median time of 279.89 seconds, to complete the survey. Table 1 displays the participants' demographics. The survey participants had a greater proportion of women than the real US population (0.77 against 0.97 male/female) and their ages were concentrated in the 25-49year-old range. The participants largely declared themselves to be politically liberal, with more than half having completed at least a university or college degree. 
Demographic
RQ1: Does the Punishment of AI and Robots Fulfill Its Functions?
Our first research question was framed to collect the general perception of participants on the overall punishability of electronic agents. The participants largely disagreed with the idea of granting assets to robots and AI (N =1935, P<.001) or allowing them physical independence (N =224, P<.001). Fig. 2 shows the overall reaction to granting assets to AI and robots and maintaining their physical independence. With respect to the main functions of punishment in society (i.e., deterrence, retribution, and reform), Fig. 2 the mean values and standard errors of the responses regarding susceptibility to punishment (deterrence), ability to learn from mistakes (reform), and capacity to suffer as retribution (retribution). Positive values (range=(0, 2]) indicate a more positive attitude towards the fulfillment of punishment functions by electronic agents.
also shows
Our results show that people do not perceive the punishment of electronic agents as fulfilling its functions (N =1711, P<.001), except when dealing with reform (N =1711, P<.001). The positive attitude towards reform indicates that people see the correction of the behavior of electronic agents as achievable. We also conducted pairwise Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) tests on each of the variables addressed in the questions using the agent type (AI program or robot) and the autonomy level as treatment groups. The results show that the participants saw robots as more difficulty to punish in terms of susceptibility to punishment (∆=-0.211, P<.01), reform (∆=-0.154, P<.05), and retribution (∆=-0.271, P<.001). The idea of granting assets was also seen as more absurd in the case of robots than in the case of AI (∆=-0.183, P<.01). Regarding autonomy levels, supervised electronic agents were to be judged less susceptible to punishment (∆=-0.118, P<.05) but easier to re-educate (∆=0.131, P<.05).
RQ2: Who Is Responsible and Should Be
Punished upon Damage?
The next research question is "How do people think responsibility, awareness, and punishment should be distributed between the electronic agent and the associated entities involved in the deployment of robots and AI in the case of a legal offense?". Fig. 3 shows the average responsibility, awareness, and punishment levels assigned by the participants to each of the associates presented in the survey.
The results from Tukey's HSD test, in Table 2 , reveal any significant relationship between the type of agent (i.e., AI or robot) and all associates (i.e., manufacturer, owner, programmer, and supervisor) as treatment groups in a linear model. The scenario type (i.e., medicine or war) is used as a control variable in the model. The participants allocated a lower level of responsibility and punishment to electronic agents than to all the other associates; the value is not "null, " however, indicating that people thought robots and AI as agents must be punished for damage. Regarding awareness, electronic agents scored far lower than all other associates. Finally, the liability attached to all associates was similar across the board.
Entities
Responsibility Significance marked as † P<.1, * P<.05, * * P<.01, * * * P<.001. Table 2 : Pairwise comparison of people's attitudes towards electronic agents and associates. Negative values mean the entity on the right is deemed more responsible, aware, or worthy of punishment than the one on the left.
RQ3: How Differently Do People Judge Humans and Electronic Agents?
The next question asked how differently people assign responsibility, awareness, and punishment to natural and electronic agents. The scenarios were identical to those in RQ2 except for the associates since they might not apply to both types of agent. Fig. 4(a) shows how the variables were assigned among all associates in the case of offense by a human agent. In this case, the human agent him-or herself was assigned the most responsibility, awareness, and punishment, followed by the supervisor and employer by a large margin. Tukey's HSD test confirms that pairwise differences are significant at the P<.001 level or more across all three measures. This finding reveals that a human supervisor is perceived as more responsible, aware, and punishable than a human employer upon a human agent's offense. Fig. 4(b) shows people's perception of responsibility, awareness, and punishment agreement over an offense by a human agent versus an electronic agent. Humans are always seen as more liable than automated agents, especially in terms of awareness. The mean perception of awareness of AI and robot agents scores between 0 (i.e., "not aware at all") and 1 (i.e., "a little aware"), as opposed to the awareness of human agents, which received a score of nearly 2 (i.e., "somewhat aware"). Tukey's HSD test (Table 3) relationships indicates that between the electronic agents, AI is perceived as marginally more responsible and aware than robots (both P<.001), and an AI agent is deemed more accountable than a human employer (P<.001, as shown in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) ). In terms of punishment agreement, however, the difference was not significant between AI and robot agents.
We also found that less responsibility and punishment are assigned to supervisors of human agents (∆ r esponsibil ity =-0.180 and ∆ punishment =-0.163, both P<.001) than to supervisors of electronic agents. Supervisors are also considered somewhat more aware when they supervise a human than when they supervise an automated agent (∆ awar eness =0.085, P<.05). Finally, our results suggest that a human employer is seen as deserving less punishment and as less responsible than all associates for both electronic and human agents (P<.001).
Entities
Responsibility 
RQ4: Who Is to Blame Under Supervision?
The final research question asked whether a different level of autonomy alters people's assignment of liability to agents and their associates. We conducted Tukey's HSD tests with a model similar to those used for RQ2 and RQ3 except for the introduction of the level of autonomy as treatment groups. Our results indicates that electronic agents are seen as less deserving of punishment, less responsible and less aware (∆ punishment =-0.245; ∆ r esponsibil ity =-0.249; ∆ awar eness =-0.187, all P<.001) under supervision. Manufacturers and programmers are assigned less responsibility if the electronic agent is supervised (P<.01), while the supervisor is deemed more responsible if the agent is supervised (∆ r esponsibil ity =0.180, P<.01). The supervisor is also considered more aware if the electronic agent is supervised (∆ awar eness =0.237, P<.001). In terms of punishment, the manufacturer, owner, and programmer are assigned less punishment (P<.05), while the opposite is true for the supervisor (∆ punishment =0.153, P<.05) when the electronic agent is supervised.
The same trends are obvious for a human agent, who is deemed less liable when supervised (∆ r esponsibility =-0.335; ∆ awar eness =-0.231; ∆ punishment =-0.278, all P<.001), while the liability of the employer and supervisor increases (P<.001). In conclusion, our results indicate that the assigned liability of an agent increases if the agent is autonomous regardless of its nature.
DISCUSSION 5.1 RQ1: Difficulty in Punishing AI and Robots
Many scholars find the punishment of robots and AI difficult, if not impossible [3, 11, 17, 20, 56, 60] . Our survey results indicate that online users perceive it similarly, as demonstrated by the negative values of mean attitude towards assets, physical independence, deterrence, and retribution questions shown in Fig. 2 . The only positive attitude was shown towards the potential of AI and robots to be reformed (i.e., ability to learn from or reprogram the wrongful action). We discuss these findings in depth.
First, people see the possibility of granting assets to AI and robots as unreasonable. This is consistent with the negative attitude towards maintaining the physical independence of AI and robots, which shows that the general public is opposed to electronic agents having any (financial and physical) freedom. Several authors have discussed how sci-fi scenarios influence people's perception of the abilities of AI and robots by presenting a speculative "machines out-of-control" scenario [7, 39] . We thus hypothesize that people perceive granting assets and physical independence to electronic agents as a possible form of liberating them from human control, which they imagine as dangerous due to various sci-fi movies that show independent automated agents as enemies. Future work should tackle how public preconceptions of electronic agents influence the assignment of liability to AI and robots.
Second, among the punishment functions (see Fig. 2 ), our results indicate that people perceive AI and robots as entities that can be reformed. This perception may be caused by the growing trend of current systems learning through experience, such as through reinforcement learning [27] . People do not find the punishment of AI and robots a satisfactory way to deal with retribution, often related to vengeance and the preference to restore justice (i.e., desert) [24] , as discussed by Danaher [20] and confirmed by our results. Finally, people do not see electronic agents as entities that are susceptible to punishment, a vital aspect of deterrence. Nonetheless, even though these agents are not vulnerable to the current forms of punishment of humans, this susceptibility may be implemented in the future similarly to the way rewards and punishments are used in reinforcement learning. A possible future line of work in reinforcement learning could be modeling these social and legal functions of punishment mathematically as a form of training electronic agents.
In conclusion, the difficulty of punishing AI and robots discussed above is not restricted to retribution but also encompasses other functions of punishment, such as deterrence. We thus define the nonfulfillment of punishment functions by AI and robots and the public unwillingness to grant financial and physical independence to electronic agents as the punishment gap. As shown in the results for RQ2, these agents are seen as (at least causally) responsible for their actions and should be punished when they cause damage. However, people agree that the current forms of punishment applied to humans could not be successfully transferred to electronic agents. Even though reform is an essential function of punishment, deterrence and retribution [20] are not satisfied.
Researchers have suggested that the key to dealing with this punishment gap is to incorporate better and more realistic interests into electronic agents. Turner [56] , for instance, proposes that we can encourage automated agents to think correctly and learn from their mistakes by embedding practical motivations. Turner suggests this approach as a form of shaping the agent's behavior by signaling that certain undesirable consequences that are opposed to the agent's interests will follow the breaking of rules. If more realistic interests for humans are embedded in the development of electronic agents, the needs created by the damage caused to the victims could also be more easily satisfied; for example, if we can implement some visible pain into these systems and people see electronic agents suffering from that pain, the retribution gap could be relatively closed. Centuries ago, animals were publicly killed by hanging if they committed a crime, even though they were not aware of it, to satisfy society's need for retribution. Nevertheless, it is currently difficult to conceptualize "undesirable consequences", "suffering", or "realistic concerns from a human point of view" for electronic agents, and all of these concepts must be addressed and better defined before legal personhood is granted to AI and robots.
A prominent solution for the punishment gap would be to allow AI and robots to hold insurance policies [61] . While drawing the chain of responsibility to associates might prove difficult for future electronic agents, connecting the AI or robot to the damage caused might be the best option if the agent is given the ability to compensate those harmed. For instance, the electronic agent's insurance premiums could be covered by a pool of assets gathered from associates, guaranteeing compensation for damages. Given civil law's focus on compensating those harmed, allowing electronic agents to hold such policies would enable legal systems to more easily seek compensation from the responsible party (i.e., AI and robots). The punishment would effectively be transferred to existing legal persons through the payment of insurance premiums. The imposition of liability on AI and robots could deal with the retributive aspect of the punishment gap, as the punishment would be applied to the electronic agent itself, satisfying the public demand for punishment. Finally, if the prices of insurance premiums could better shape the behavior of AI and robots, the deterrence aspect of the punishment gap could be solved by making these premiums (and systems) extremely expensive if the systems do not follow safety requirements.
RQ2: Awareness-lacking Agents Are Still Subject to Responsibility and Punishment
The survey results shown in Fig. 3 and Table 2 indicate that people perceive AI and robots as responsible and deserving of punishment upon an offense. However, people do not think that these agents are aware of their actions. The survey question on awareness was intended to reveal whether people attribute any mental state to liable agents, a fundamental concept in criminal and civil law. However, the survey results indicate that people assign little or no mental state to robots and AI through the various scenarios. As in to the case dealing with autonomous vehicles [6] , machines are held to be causally responsible for their actions. Electronic agents, however, are assigned less punishment than all their associates. This finding is in line with the psychological evidence that punishment assignment is a two-step process-it originates from causality and consequences followed by the understanding of the intention and mental state of the agent [19] . Robots and AI are indeed perceived as causally responsible for their actions. Due to their low level of awareness and lack of a mental state or intentions, however, they deserve punishment less than their associates do, according to the general public. Much human-computer interaction research has focused on the development of social robots that can elicit mind perception through anthropomorphization [33, 52] ; therefore, we might have obtained higher awareness perception had we introduced what the robot or AI looked like.
Associates of electronic agents (i.e., manufacturer, owner, programmer, and supervisor) were assigned similar levels of responsibility, awareness, and punishment. This result indicates that the general public believes a liability model based on joint and several liability could be an appropriate solution to the difficult task of imposing liability in the case of damage caused by AI and robots. If several entities involved in the deployment of electronic agents are held liable for their respective obligations or jointly undertaken responsibilities, public demand for their punishment could be dealt with. Given the complexity of these systems which are often composed of various parts built and programmed by different entities, a model based on "common enterprise" liability could also be justified by forcing a group of entities (e.g., enterprises such as manufacturers) that worked together towards the goal of deploying such an electronic agent to compensate victims for damages [61] . The manufacturer, however, received marginally lower liability, which contradicts the current landscape of law. Currently, manufacturers are often held liable for damage caused by AI and robots (e.g., Uber was held responsible when its autonomous car killed a pedestrian).
RQ3: AI and Robots Are Seen as Liable, but Less Than Humans
How responsibility and punishment are assigned to a supervisor varies depending on the type of agent. A supervisor is considered significantly more responsible and worthy of punishment when directing an electronic agent than when supervising a human agent. An employer of a human agent is considered less accountable, aware, and punishable than all associates of the electronic counterpart. We hypothesize that this is caused partly by the idea defended by some authors that robots and AI should be treated as "slaves" [10] . Less blame and punishment for the actions of a subordinate are assigned to employers than to the "slave masters", or associates, of a robot or AI; electronic agents are still seen as mere tools to some extent. Robots and AI are assigned responsibility and deserve punishment for their actions, but at lower levels than humans. This conclusion agrees with the psychological evidence that punishment is a two-step process that also depends on the perception of mind; humans possess minds (i.e., awareness), while robots and AI do not. The responsibility assignment follows a similar pattern: electronic agents are held causally responsible, while humans are considered both causally and morally responsible, resulting in higher reported responsibility values. Future work should address which of the various notions of responsibility [57] are indeed attributed to electronic agents.
RQ4: Supervision Decreases the Responsibility and Punishment of Electronic Agents
Regarding the different autonomy levels of electronic agents, the survey results indicate that supervised AI and robots are assigned less responsibility and punishment than unsupervised agents, as in the case of autonomous vehicles [6] . This finding explains the increased liability of supervisors, as discussed in RQ3. As noted by many supporters of electronic legal personhood, as these agents become more autonomous, they will be considered more responsible for their actions and thus will deserve punishment to some extent. Agreeing with the scholarly argument that finding an entity accountable for an action will become more difficult as systems become more autonomous, our results indicate that the general public also decreases the amount of responsibility assigned to associates, such as manufacturers and programmers. Whenever AI or robots appeared as entirely autonomous entities, we included the supervisor as an associate for comparison. In a system of ultimate autonomy, however, there might not be a supervisor in practice. In such a case, the responsibility assigned to individual associates would be lower, and the electronic agent might need to be held solely or mostly responsible for its action.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
These study results indicate that the general public sees machinesi.e., AI and robots-as responsible agents that deserve punishment, even though they lack awareness. Yet survey participants see the punishment of robots and AI as a somewhat impossible task. Our results indicate that the participants preferred that robots and AI should not own assets and should not have physical independence. There is no sense in imposing civil liability on agents that are incapable of owning assets, and there is no sense in imposing criminal liability on agents that are not physically independent. They are not seen as susceptible to punishment, which is an essential precondition for deterrence, and their punishment would not satisfy the victims' demand for retribution. Therefore, there exists not just the previously proposed retribution gap [20] but a broader punishment gap. The punishment gap stems from the public's desire to punish electronic agents despite the collective agreement that punishing them is not successful or even possible, regardless of their legal status.
It may be argued that this gap results from the fundamental limitation of electronic agents as inadequate subjects and, therefore, will not be resolved anytime soon, technically or legally. Nevertheless, it can be expected that various stakeholders will attempt to address these gaps in one way or another. Such solutions could be more readily accepted if people recognized the physical and financial independence of AI and robots. Future societies might change their position on the issue, as they have done with animal and human rights [56] .
This research by no means proposes that robots and AI should be the sole entities to hold liability for their actions. In contrast, the survey results show that responsibility, awareness, and punishment are assigned to all associates. We thus posit that a distributed liability assignment among all entities involved in the deployment of these systems would be in accordance with the public perception of the issue. Such a model could take joint and several liability models as a starting point by enforcing the proposal that various entities should be held jointly liable for damages caused. When assigning liability, many variables should be taken into consideration, such as negligence and foreseeability, to balance innovation, the adoption of new technologies, and the safety of all stakeholders.
Electronic legal personhood will become a viable option only if AI and robots are granted assets or physical independence, which would allow civil and criminal liability to be imposed, or if punishment functions and methods are adapted to AI and robots. People demand that electronic agents be punished; they do not, however, agree on how to achieve it. This public contradiction might need to be addressed by broad legal or social reframing if punishment gap is ever to be solved. One might argue, however, that robots and AI will still lack morality, as discussed by Brozek [9] , which is an essential aspect for the imposition of criminal liability on AI. What is more important, however, is that law is often perpendicular to morality. We confine individuals for the very reason that they might not be capable of making moral choices, as in insanity cases. As argued in this paper, physical and financial independence are more important than moral capacity as requirements of legal liability.
Our work aims to be a starting point of more democratic debate over this controversial topic regarding the difficult task of imposing liability in the case of damages caused by autonomous and self-learning systems that challenge the current understanding of intentionality and autonomy. The survey results should serve to raise awareness and spark future discussions about how to incorporate the public's different and sometimes incongruent views of AI and robots into the policy design process. We note that an AMT sample, as presented in this study, is not entirely representative of the general population, as it does not control for all demographic variability. We believe that future studies must address this issue with both more representative samples and stakeholder groups, such as policymakers and computer scientists. Turkers, nevertheless, are essential stakeholders in the deployment of AI and robots as their work (e.g., annotating data for supervised machine learning models) is often used to train these electronic agents. Therefore, their values and beliefs might be embedded in systems that are currently being deployed or will be deployed soon.
We selected scenarios from two areas (i.e., medicine and war) in which AI and robots are currently being deployed; however, the judgment of the actions of electronic agents might change depending on the scenario or background. The proposed scenarios did not introduce, for the sake of feasibility and brevity, much of the background that is usually considered when judging someone's actions. We also did not control for any previous attitude towards AI and robots or knowledge of related areas, such as law and computer science, which could result in different judgments among the participants. In future work, we plan to conduct similar studies with control groups of diverse stakeholders in the development and regulation of AI and robots.
Nevertheless, our survey results reveal how responsibility, awareness, and punishment are assigned to agents depending on their nature, which is a critical aspect in a modern and technological society. We hope this research promotes a more inclusive discussion of a prominent, yet controversial, solution to issues raised by the deployment of AI and robots-i.e., the creation of electronic legal personhood. We believe that this debate, alongside our study, sets a starting point for scholars to investigate more deeply how much responsibility the system, the user, the manufacturer, the programmer, and many other entities should bear in the most diverse situations. We do not support or oppose electronic legal personhood; we solely posit, based on empirical evidence, that its adoption is currently not feasible from the public perspective given the existing legal doctrines and electronic agents. In future work, we hope to better understand the punishment gap to arrive at a viable solution before automated electronic agents are more widely deployed throughout various sectors of society. Even though punishing electronic agents is difficult in the current environment, this issue deserves a more thorough discussion regardless of the status of such entities as legal persons.
